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Abstract 
This article proposes a two-country model of electricity trade under peak-load pricing. We 
apply the model to France and the UK to assess the benefit to the UK of trade within the 
European internal energy market (IEM). Calibration and simulations of the model aimed at 
simulating bilateral trade in the market coupling process at electricity exchanges show the 
following. First, the occurrence of gains from trade for both countries is highly dependent on 
whether imported electricity affects the price in the local market and whether imports 
alleviate scarcity. Second, the main effect of importing electricity is a shift in welfare from 
domestic producers to domestic consumers of the importing country. Finally, the UK’s 
membership in the IEM generates additional welfare for the UK of up to 900 M€ per year 
across a range of scenarios in which the number of on-peak periods are exogenously varied in 
a conservative way relative to the actual data. 
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1. Introduction 
What is the future of the trade relations between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European 
Union (EU)? What about the exchange of such an important commodity as electricity? More 
than three years after the fateful referendum that put Britain on its way out of the EU, many 
questions remain open while economists have a range of possible scenarios to study that 
seemed unthinkable just a few years before. The rollback of the integration between 
electricity markets in the UK and abroad is among them. Indeed, even though fundamental 
insights from industrial organization and regulatory economics largely apply to the electricity 
sector, the high degree to which this sector is still regulated and was historically shaped by 
mostly state-owned vertically-integrated monopolies, as well as issues of essential facilities, 
environmental externalities, and technology set this sector apart. 
What are the benefits of linking up electricity markets and how can we quantify these 
benefits? What do gains from trade look like in electricity markets under peak-load pricing? 
In this article, we rely on a computational-analytical model to characterize short-term 
electricity market equilibria and perform an analysis with the aim of feeding the economic 
policy debate surrounding the UK’s political stance on the EU. Using data on the UK and 
France, we calibrate the model and perform simulations with the objective of assessing how 
valuable membership in the internal energy market (IEM) is for the UK. In the context of 
Brexit, this issue is of great relevance for related trade negotiations, as each side will demand 
economically sound proof for demands raised by its counterpart. 
The events that this study refers to evolved rapidly while this research was undertaken. 
Less than three weeks after the official request to leave the EU had been sent to Brussels by 
the British Government, Reuters reported that the British Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change strongly advocated for the UK to remain part of the IEM.1 The same report 
mentions that in 2016 the UK imported 6% of its electricity from abroad, invested in more 
interconnectors with Ireland, and expects imports to cover up to 20% of peak-demand by the 
early 2020s.2 Given the context of Brexit and the expressed interest of British politicians to 
continue membership in the IEM, this article investigates the value of the gains from trade 
that arise under market coupling.3  
Both the coupling of markets and the idea that trade enhances welfare have received 
much attention in the energy literature. Neuhoff and Newberry (2005) have examined the 
welfare consequences of electricity markets coupling and the prospects of market integration 
in the European context. While arguing for potential welfare gains stemming from market 
integration, these authors caution that initially there could be price increases and that 
regulatory cooperation is important to achieve the full potential of market integration. In her 
study of market integration between the UK and Ireland, Valeri (2009) finds that welfare 
increases with interconnector capacity and concludes that relying on private incentives alone 
may lead to underinvestment in interconnector capacity.  
                                                      
1 See Chestney (2017). 
2 "Interconnector" is the technical term for an electricity link that connects different countries’ national 
electricity grids. 
3 The interest of the UK in retaining the benefits of the single European electricity market has further been 
expressed in the letter addressed by the UK Prime Minister to the President of the European Council on August 
19, 2019. See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pm-letter-to-donald-tusk-19-august-2019. 
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This article seeks to contribute to the energy literature both in the question analyzed 
and the methodology used to answer it. Overall, it is somewhat surprising that the study of 
electricity trade has mainly been considered at a national/firm level rather than at an 
international/country level. Our article seeks to contribute to filling this void. To the best of 
our knowledge this article is not only one of the first attempts to analyze gains from 
electricity trade between neighboring countries, namely, Britain and France, but also to 
explore the economic consequences on a specific sector of the Brexit political event. 
Nevertheless, concerning the electricity sector, we should mention a quite recent article by 
Geske et al. (2019). While this article is close to ours in that it explores the cost of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the IEM, it differs in a few respects. 
First, Geske et al. (2019) look at the potential costs of market uncoupling for a 2030-
scenario based on data from before market coupling took place. In this article, we use recent 
(2016) data of the coupled British and French markets to simulate the demand and supply 
structure of the two markets. Second, the source of inefficiency introduced by these authors is 
market uncertainty as markets for transmission rights and electricity do not clear 
simultaneously without market coupling. In fact, even their most extreme scenario, the "Hard 
Elecxit," assumes some interconnector capacity and trade. In contrast, we use a mechanism 
that looks directly at the welfare impacts of changes in price that arise from the absence of 
trade. In this sense, our version of market decoupling is more radical as it compares the status 
quo to the case with no trade.4 Third, and as is to be expected from the previous remark, our 
model yields higher potential welfare losses from decoupling.5 
Adopting a country- rather than a firm-level approach, however, comes at the cost of 
having to neglect some of the market failures implications of imperfect competition, although 
our choice of timing in the model somewhat mitigates such a concern.6 Moreover, we feel 
that the potential benefits of contributing to understanding the economic consequences on 
various sectors of such a big political event as the withdrawal of a major country from the EU 
more than compensate for the costs of making some simplifying modeling assumptions. In 
fact, some authors have already shown how the economic approach is useful to analyze 
important political economy issues concerning electricity markets. Among others, Lilliestam 
and Ellenbeck (2011) have used a bargaining approach to figure out whether the EU would 
be vulnerable to extortion if it decided to import large quantities of solar energy from North 
Africa. Our article perhaps shares the theme of this stream of the literature, if not the 
methodology. 
                                                      
4 While we don’t claim that the existing links will be broken the day Britain leaves the EU, this radical view has 
the advantage of comprehensively quantifying the benefits that trade generates. 
5 As we will see, our simulations show that these welfare losses surpass 900M€ for the UK alone. This contrasts 
with the estimate of circa 600 M€ for the UK and France, of which more than 50% is born by Great Britain, in 
the "Hard Elecxit" scenario considered by Gaske et al. (2019). Ambec and Crampes (2019) argue that these 
authors’ estimate might even prove to be too high.  
6 In our model, the level of prices is determined by the cost of the available production technologies. Hence, if a 
firm with market power increased the price of a technology above cost, it could obtain rents. Although this 
could have a numerical impact on how consumer surplus and producer surplus are split and allow foreign 
exporters to increase prices, the resulting flow of electricity would not change as long as the merit order of 
technologies was not fundamentally changed. This "umbrella effect," of market power, which is more 
commonly known from the study of cartels, could then even increase the gains from trade in the form of 
exporters’ profit. On umbrella effects, see, e.g., Inderst et al. (2014). Demand, transmission capacity, and 
capacity would, however, be unchanged by such a price increase. 
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Turning to methodology, in this article we adopt a computational-analytical approach. 
More specifically, we formulate a simple theoretical model and illustrate its inner working 
via a numerical example, before answering the question of interest by a calibration of the 
model fueled by data on electricity consumption and production in France and the UK. 
Simulations provide a strong alternative to the traditionally used systems of equations when 
assumptions that are needed to take into account real-life constraints permit no elegant 
closed-form solution. Nevertheless, there is a debate on whether economists shun less elegant 
or less general simulations in favor of models that can be solved analytically.7 By grounding 
the calibration of our model with empirical evidence and demonstrating the internal 
coherence of the model with a large number of simulations, in this article we give the priority 
to what we see as a more realistic solution over mathematical elegance. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the legislative and institutional 
framework surrounding the IEM, which is characterized by national, international, and 
supranational actors, both private and public, and a set of organizations that coordinate them. 
This legislative and institutional picture will serve the purpose of helping us in the setting up 
of the model. Section 3 presents a computational model of two interconnected countries 
facing stochastic demand and producing with base-load, peak-load, and renewable electricity 
supply technologies that we use to assess welfare effects of trade. This section also provides, 
as a check of the coherence of the model, a numerical illustration of the results obtained by 
simulating it. Section 4 presents a calibration of the model to the case of UK-France 
electricity trade and discusses the gains from trade for each party. Section 5 concludes. 
Additional tables and figures used in the discussions are provided in an appendix. 
 
2. The European Internal Energy Market 
The institutional framework surrounding the trade of electricity within the EU is quite 
complex and involves many actors. Both for the better understanding of the underlying 
economic questions and the justification of our modeling assumptions, this section seeks to 
give an overview of this framework as far as electricity is concerned. First, we describe the 
legislation that framed the IEM. Then, we present the current set of actors and their 
respective roles in the IEM. Finally, we explain the technology and market design that make 
cross-border electricity trade work between the UK and the rest of Europe. 
 
The legislative framework 
The development of the IEM by the EU is defined by the legacy of incumbent electricity 
generating companies, national regulatory agencies (NRAs), and nationally designed grids. It 
is also defined by the forward-thrusting initiatives of the EU that have been trying to create 
the IEM through an expansion of interconnection capacity, harmonized rules for cross-border 
electricity trade, competition, and greater institutional coherence over the last 20 years. Table 
1 below lists the main legislations that shaped the development of the IEM. 
 
                                                      
7 Miranda and Fackler (2004) state: "When essential features of an economic system being studied cannot be 
faithfully captured in an algebraically soluble model, a choice must be made. Either essential features of the 
system must be ignored in order to obtain an algebraically tractable model, or numerical techniques must be 
applied. Too often economists chose algebraic tractability over economic realism." 
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Table 1 - The IEM legislative framework (Electricity) 
Year Legislation Issue(s)  
1990 − Council Directive 
90/377/EEC  
− Transparency of prices charged to industrial end-
users 
1990 − Council Directive 
90/547/EEC 
− Transit of electricity through transmission grids 
1996  − Directive 96/92/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council  
− Rules for the internal market in electricity 
− Rules for generation, transmission, and distribution 
of electricity 
− Creation of TSOs and interconnectors 
2003 − Directive 2003/54/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council 
− Rules for the internal market in electricity, repealing 
Directive 96/92/EC 
− Production efficiency 
− Competition in generation, market dominance and 
predatory behavior 
− Access to transmission and distribution networks 
2009 − Directive 2009/72/EC of 
the European Parliament 
and of the Council 
− Regulation (EC) 
713/2009 of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council 
− Regulation (EC) 
714/2009 of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council 
− Regulation (EU) 
2019/942 of the 
European Parliament and 
of the Council 
− Rules for the internal energy market, repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC 
− Unbundling of energy generation and networks 
− Creation of the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulator (ACER) 
− Coordinate the development of network codes 
within a common organization (European Network 
of Transmission System Operators for Electricity, 
ENTSO) 
 
 
While some of the first EU legislation referencing the IEM was passed in 1990 with 
Council Directive 90/377/EEC in order "to improve the transparency of gas and electricity 
prices charged to industrial end-user" (European Commission, 1990a) and Council Directive 
90/547/EEC dealing with "the transit of electricity through transmission grids" (European 
Commission, 1990b), Meeus et al. (2005) date the first real steps towards the IEM to 1996 
with the Directive 96/92/EG (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 
1996). This piece of legislation "establishes common rules for the generation, transmission, 
and distribution of electricity," including the creation of Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs), in charge of operating and maintaining (national) transmission services, as well as 
interconnectors with other systems. 
This first approach addressed, among other issues, some concerns regarding vertical 
integration, calling for separate accounts and separate management where TSOs are 
integrated with the owners of the transmission infrastructure. In 2003, it was succeeded and 
replaced by Directive 2003/54/EC (European Commission, 2003) acknowledging the 
"benefits that may result from the internal market in electricity, in terms of efficiency gains, 
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price reductions, higher standards of service, and increased competitiveness", while raising 
market power concerns. Its main focus at the time was to create "a level playing field in 
generation and reduce the risks of market dominance and predatory behavior, ensuring non-
discriminatory transmission and distribution tariffs through access to the network on the basis 
of tariffs published prior to their entry into force." The directive established compliance rules 
for TSOs that were vertically integrated with transmission owners, rules regarding third-party 
access, and a gradual opening of electricity markets on the demand side, first to industrial 
customers and then to all customers by 2007. 
Finally, the next major step in the development of the IEM was reached in 2009 with 
the passing of the so-called "Third Energy Package" consisting of two directives, Directive 
2009/72/EC for electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC for gas, one authority creation 
regulation, Regulation (EC) No. 713, and two access regulations, Regulations (EC) No. 
714/2009 and 715/2009 for electricity and gas, respectively. The two directives define 
common rules for the electricity and gas markets while the electricity access regulation 
defines conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges, the gas access 
regulation defines conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, and the 
authority creation regulation establishes an Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER). 
This package sets conditions with regards to the unbundling of transmission capacity 
and operation and retail competition, as well as provisions concerning natural gas (European 
Commission, 2009). The ACER replaces the European Regulator Group for Electricity and 
Gas (ERGEG) since neither ERGEG nor the NRAs were deemed fit to cope with EU-level 
regulation (European Commission, 2011). In addition, the technical details regarding third-
party access, security, and interconnection are dealt with through the so called "Network 
codes," drafted by the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO) in 
accordance with the "Framework guidelines" set by ACER. 
Another focus of the 2009 legislation was consumer protection and price transparency. 
The previous legislation from 2003 was repealed in 2009, namely, Directive 2009/72/EC 
(European Commission, 2009). This legislation on rules and institutions was accompanied by 
investment strategies of the European Commission, such as the "Energy 2020" and "Energy 
2030" strategies. The current state of the IEM is regularly reported in progress reports from 
the European Commission to the other bodies of the EU.8 The EU seeks to reconcile both 
economic and political goals with its policies. Apart from cost savings, economic growth, and 
jobs, the EU Commission's sets goals to the development of the IEM that include stability 
and security of energy supply and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, most 
importantly, carbon dioxide. 
 
Key aspects of the EU electricity market structure 
The market structure of the European electricity sector has become increasingly complex 
over time due to a flurry of EU regulation that has created an unwieldy amount of 
institutions, each playing a role in the creation of the IEM. Table 2 summarizes some 
                                                      
8 See European Commission (2012 and 2014). 
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important aspects of EU electricity market structure, from both the value chain and property 
rights and physical side, which we discuss next. 
 
Table 2 - EU electricity industry’s main actors and their role: Value chain and 
property rights and physical side 
Value chain Property rights and physical side  
Actor(s) Role  
Option 1 
 
Option 2  
Producers 
 
Generate electricity 
Energy exchange − Aggregation of 
bids to supply and 
demand curves 
− Matching of bids 
according to a 
merit order 
Producers dispatch 
energy 
Producers dispatch 
energy 
Wholesalers − Submission of 
bids 
− Electricity trade 
Producers own the 
grid 
TSOs own the grid 
Retailers − Selling electricity 
to final consumers 
ISOs manage the grid TSOs manage the 
grid 
Consumers − Electricity 
consumption 
Consumers receive 
electricity 
Consumers receive 
electricity 
 
On the local level there are electricity generators and consumers. The demand from 
consumers and the supply from electricity producers are matched at electricity exchanges 
where wholesale agents or retailers bid for electricity offered by the producers.9 The matching 
process typically happens in the form of forward auctions, e.g., day-ahead markets for short-
term contracts and is usually accompanied by financial contracts that allocate the risk of price 
fluctuations between the parties.  
The transmission of electricity happens through high-, medium-, and low-voltage links 
that have been historically owned by large electricity-producing companies, but which in 
some cases have been transferred to independent companies. In any case, with respect to EU 
law, the management and maintenance of these transmission links has to be separated from 
the generation of electricity. The reason for this is that transmission capacity serves as part of 
the value chain from electricity generation to retail and that vertical integration of these 
activities is therefore deemed undesirable from a competition standpoint as it raises concerns 
of market power and foreclosure. 
Directive 2009/72/EC leaves EU member states with different options to implement 
this separation. The management and maintenance of the transmission links may be allocated 
to TSOs, which can be natural or legal persons separate from electricity producers and are 
subject to strict compliance rules to ensure their independence. The goal here is to allow 
                                                      
9 Two examples of such exchanges are Nord Pool, covering the Nordic and Baltic countries, Germany, and the 
UK and EPEX Spot, operating mainly in Germany, France, the UK, and the Benelux countries. Several 
exchanges can be competing in the same country. 
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access to the transmission network to all producers under equal conditions, thus creating a 
level playing field and preventing large electricity producers owning transmission links from 
foreclosing rivals. 
Alternatively, where ownership of transmission links remains with producers, the 
creation of ISOs is an option. ISOs are entities owned by the electricity producing companies 
but are under strict rules to exclude conflicts of interest with the transmission owners, mainly 
to ensure third-party access without interference of the transmission owner. This form of 
independent management can be organized in the form of a fully owned subsidiary with a 
separate branding.10 
In any case, each TSO is represented at the European level through the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO) the main responsibility of which is to 
design the network code and set the technical specifications that allow the flow of electricity 
between different markets. However, even though TSOs appear to be the more divested 
option, there are some political concerns, especially in the UK, about the possibility of 
conflicts of interest with TSOs being "system operators and for-profit owners of energy 
infrastructure" (a point raised in a report by the law firm Pinsent Masons LLP, 2016).  
Table 3 below lists the main actors of the energy sector, namely, NGOs, private 
operators, and regulators at the European, international, and national level. NRAs are in 
charge of enforcing the rules and laws that govern the European electricity markets. They 
also act to protect consumers. Recognized by EU directives, they are mandated to be 
independent of the national executive branch of governments and other actors in the 
electricity market. At the European level, they form two bodies, namely, the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER). With the phasing out of the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(ERGEG) in 2011, some of its tasks have been taken over by ACER, which is an independent 
body of the EU and mainly charged with legislation, while CEER focuses on cooperation in 
other complementary fields of pan-European interest, such as smart grids, sustainability, and 
customer issues. Even though both work towards the realization of the IEM, their tasks are 
complementary and not overlapping. 
 
Table 3 - Energy NGOs, private operators, and regulators at the European, 
international, and national level 
Level Actor(s) 
European EURELECTRIC EFET ACER CEER ENTSO 
 
International 
 
(Most) energy 
companies 
 
Energy 
exchanges 
   
 
National 
 
National trade 
associations 
  
NRAs 
  
 
On the business side, the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) is the trade 
association of electricity exchanges in Europe that represents the common interest of 
                                                      
10 Note that ISOs are more common in the United States. 
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electricity exchanges at the European level. The electricity generating companies have a 
similar body named EURELECTRIC, the union of national trade associations in the 
electricity-generating sector. 
 
Electricity trade between the UK and the rest of Europe 
How is the UK electricity network connected to the rest of Europe? Currently, National Grid, 
the UK’s TSO, is involved in several business ventures. First, there is the High Voltage 
Direct (HVDC) Cross-Channel interconnector that is a bi-directional link with a capacity of 
2,000 megawatt hours (MWh) operational since 1986 between the British and French 
electricity grids.11 It is jointly owned and managed by a subsidiary of National Grid, namely, 
National Grid Interconnectors Limited, and the French TSO Réseau de Transport 
d'Électricité (RTE). Another interconnector with capacity of 500 MWh links the UK and 
Ireland and further interconnectors between the UK and France, Belgium, Denmark, and 
Iceland are being planned. 
In addition to these interconnectors, the 260-km interconnector BritNed links the UK 
and the Netherlands since 2011. This interconnector with a capacity of 1000 MWh is bi-
directional and is operated by BritNed Development Ltd, a joint-venture of National Grid and 
NLink, a subsidiary of the Dutch-German TSO TenneT. The trade of electricity passing 
through this interconnector is organized in both explicit auctions, run on a proprietary 
platform of BritNed Development Ltd, and implicit auctions, run on EPEX Spot, an electricity 
exchange.12 
These interconnectors facilitate international trade of electricity through a mechanism 
called "Market Coupling." Following information provided directly by EPEX Spot, this 
mechanism works as an addition to the regular auctions that are organized at each electricity 
exchange (EPEX Spot, 2017). Each bidder provides a series of bids, where each bid specifies 
a quantity that the participant wants to buy or sell at a specific price. Auctions are blind, i.e., 
the participants do not see other bids. The set of bids allows the exchange to specify 
individual supply and demand curves that are aggregated and used to return an auction 
outcome. All of this happens nationally. However, when two markets are coupled and 
connected through an interconnector, the exchange changes the allocation so that the price 
difference between the two markets is as small as possible, subject to the capacity constraint 
of the interconnector. As a result of efficient market coupling, greater price convergence is 
thus expected to happen.13 
                                                      
11 This HVDC interconnector, or Interconnexion France-Angleterre in French, is operated under the English 
Channel to import or export electricity between France and Britain depending upon market demand conditions. 
This link will be at the center of the calibration exercise of the two-country model that we perform in this 
article. 
12 In explicit auctions transmission capacity on an interconnector is auctioned off separately from the electricity 
itself. In contrast, implicit auctions integrate the trade of electricity and the respective transmission rights. 
According to industry members (See, e.g., EPEX Spot, 2017 and Nord Pool, 2017), implicit auctions are more 
efficient as they aggregate more information and prevent inefficient underutilization or adverse flows of 
electricity resulting in welfare losses. 
13 In our model, we assume that first the market clears nationally and then opportunities for trade are realized. In 
the literature, spot prices correlation and price convergence have been widely used as an indication of the 
degree of integration of electricity markets. See, among others, Brunekreeft et al. (2005) and Zachmann 
(2008). Our goal in this article, however, is to study the economic impact of market coupling, particularly on 
the trading countries producers’ and consumers’ welfare. 
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3. The Model 
Our modeling approach draws on work that goes back to the seminal contributions of Marcel 
Boiteux on peak-load pricing (Boiteux, 1949, 1951). In an efficient market, at equilibrium, 
electricity is priced at the marginal cost of the technology with the highest marginal cost that 
is used to satisfy demand. The available generation technologies are ordered according to 
their marginal cost and supply obeys the so-called "merit order" according to which the 
technologies with lower marginal cost are dispatched first and more expensive generation 
units are successively brought online as demand increases. When future demand is unknown 
though, a market needs more capacity than the expected level of demand in order to minimize 
the possibility of excess demand.14 As future demand is unknown, it is not possible, let alone 
economically feasible, to guarantee that demand is satisfied at all times. 
To find the appropriate price when demand cannot be satisfied, different approaches 
have been proposed. Bental and Ravid (1982) develop a pricing mechanism based on firms’ 
revealed preferences while Anderson and Taylor (1986) provide an overview of different 
other methods resting on the determination of the "social cost of unsupplied electricity," 
including some based on willingness-to-pay. The issue of pricing the value of electricity that 
cannot be supplied is also central to the literature on reserve capacity.15 It is closely related to 
the concept of the average marginal willingness to pay of all consumers that cannot be 
served, the so-called "Value of Lost Load" (VoLL). 
According to the principles of peak-load pricing, the VoLL would be the efficient peak 
price. From a dynamic perspective, Joskow and Tirole (2007) consider the VoLL as the cap 
to which prices should spike at times of excess demand to ensure correct capacity investment 
incentives. In our model, we will introduce the notion of VoLL, but we will assume a fixed 
amount of installed capacity, treating investment as sunk and exogenous, hence abstracting 
away from investment incentives issues. Moreover, VoLL is introduced as an exogenous 
parameter used to determine market price when capacity is insufficient.16 Laffont and Tirole 
(1993) emphasize that peak prices must be high enough to cover long-run marginal cost 
including the cost of capital. Stoft (2002) argue that these "scarcity rents" are needed to cover 
the fixed cost of capital of the plant with the highest variable costs. 
This section introduces our model of two countries that cover their electricity demand 
with supply coming from three different technologies, namely, renewable, base-load, and 
peak-load. We first describe the key defining variables and parameters of the model (Section 
3.1). Then, we discuss how exactly we simulate the model in what we consider in this article 
as the "benchmark" scenario, namely, the case without trade (Section 3.2). Next, we 
                                                      
14 Network capacity planning is an important aspect of security of electricity supply. See, e.g., Finon and Pignon 
(2008) for an introduction to capacity planning.  
15 Reserve capacity generally refers to installed equipment that is in excess of that required to carry peak load 
and hence, as such, it concerns a broad range of economic activities. 
16 Léautier (2016) argues that while precise estimation of VoLL is impossible, commonly accepted values are in 
the 10,000-20,000 $/MWh range. In a 2013 report prepared for the UK regulator, OFGEM, and the former 
British government department, DECC, the London Economics consultancy company estimated the VoLL for 
the UK to around 19,700 €/MWh (London Economics, 2013).  
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introduce trade (Section 3.3). Finally, we illustrate the working of the model using a 
numerical example (Section 3.4).17 
 
3.1 Notation 
An iteration, denoted by the period index 𝑡 in the model, corresponds to the electricity market 
with two countries producing, consuming, and trading electricity at a certain hour on a certain 
day. Each country 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵  faces stochastic demand for electricity, measured in MWh, and 
produces electricity using three technologies: 
  
− Renewable (𝑟𝑤) energy sources that produce a varying, but fixed amount of 
electricity 𝑄!",!! . The amount that is produced is stochastic, according to some known 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) 𝐹 with a probability density function (pdf) 𝑓, at 
a constant per-unit cost 𝑐!"! . 
− Base-load (𝑏𝑙) generating plants in total number 𝑁!, e.g., nuclear reactors, each with a 
fixed and lumpy electricity output of 𝛼!, so that each country can generate output 
from this technology, 𝑄!",!! , up to 𝑄!"! ≡ 𝛼!𝑁! at a constant "virtual" marginal cost 𝑐!"! .18 
− Peak-load (𝑝𝑙) generating plants that can generate an amount of electricity 𝑄!",!!  up to 𝑄!"!  at a constant per-unit marginal cost of 𝑐!"! . 
 
We assume that the marginal costs satisfy 𝑐!"! ≤ 𝑐!"! ≤ 𝑐!"! , an inequality that is in line 
with the basic properties of most electricity generating technologies. Indeed, sun and wind 
are free (although biomass, also a form of renewable energy, is not), the fuel costs of big 
base-load nuclear power plants are low relative to their output, while more flexible fossil fuel 
plants like coal and particularly gas have higher fuel costs.19 Installation costs are all sunk so 
that we consider short-term equilibria where production and dispatch decisions are driven by 
marginal costs. 
Electricity is dispatched according to the merit order. Hence, to cover demand, first all 
renewable energy enters the grid, then the optimal number of base-load plants to dispatch 
electricity is determined. Peak-load electricity is generated if either demand exceeds 
renewable energy generation plus base-load capacity or it is more efficient to dispatch peak-
load electricity than dispatching an additional base-load plant.20 Following the peak-load 
                                                      
17 In Section 4, we run the model by first calibrating it to British and French 2016 data on consumption and 
production. 
18 The term "virtual" here reflects the fact that base-load plants supplies of electricity, 𝑄!",!! , are only available in 
chunks of 𝛼!, so that bringing in one more generator online always costs 𝛼!𝑐!"!  regardless of the proportion of 
electricity that is effectively used. Essentially, this could also be considered an average production cost per 
reactor. Surplus electricity that is not exported is thus wasted.  
19 Note that only 𝑐!"!  is a marginal cost in the classical sense, i.e., it is the effective cost of one more unit of 
electricity produced with peak-load technology. As already indicated, base-load production is not incremental 
in the model. Renewable energy production is random and always fully dispatched so that no incremental 
production decision can be made. 
20 This will be the case if the remaining demand, net of renewable electricity and all fully utilized base-load 
reactors, is small relative to the capacity of one base-load plant. This is described further below in section 3.2 
under the "in-between case." 
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principle, the wholesale price is assumed to be equal to the marginal cost associated with the 
technology with the highest variable cost. As mentioned above, base-load plants are assumed 
to be lumpy. Hence, base-load generation output only takes values 
 𝑄!",!! = !!!!! 𝑄!"! = 𝛼!𝑛!!      (1) 
 
where 𝑛!! ∈ 0,𝑁!  is the number of base-load generation units put online in period 𝑡. 
The hourly demand for electricity 𝐷!! is inelastic in each period, but varies 
stochastically between periods according to a known cumulative distribution function (cdf) 𝐺 
with a probability density function (pdf) 𝑔. The realization of demand is observed at the 
beginning of the period. In the numeral example that we have produced and later discuss, we 
confine ourselves to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables 
representing demand while in section 5 we synthesize actual demand data in a linear 
functional form to capture real-life fluctuations. 
Electricity generators behave competitively, resulting in marginal cost pricing with the 
qualifications given above. Although this may admittedly appear as a strong assumption 
given the oligopolistic market structure in many electricity markets, efficient auctions design 
at electricity exchanges should induce competitors to truthfully reveal their costs, hence 
resulting in an efficient allocation.21 The VoLL of country 𝑖 is denoted by 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! . As 
indicated above, for an iteration 𝑡, this parameter represents both consumers' willingness-to-
pay and the price to which electricity will spike when demand exceeds the maximum 
production capacity, which is given for any period by 
 𝑄!! = 𝑄!",!! + 𝑄!"! + 𝑄!"!      (2) 
 
For completeness, we denote total electricity production by 
 𝑄!! = 𝑄!",!! + 𝑄!"! + 𝑄!"!      (3) 
  
3.2 The no-trade case 
We describe the model first in the simple case without trade, i.e., under autarky. At the 
beginning of any iteration the realizations of demand and renewable energy production 
become known. The program then proceeds as follows.  
 
Partial blackout  
The program first checks whether or not the total capacity suffices to cover demand. Should 
demand exceed the production capacity in the country, we are in a situation of (partial) 
blackout. In terms of production and prices this means that all electricity resources are 
utilized, i.e., all base-load plants are online and peak-load generation is at its maximum 
                                                      
21 For the case of the US, Salant (2004) provides an overview of different types of auctions. Joskow and Tirole 
(2000) analyze market power in electricity transmission. 
 13 
capacity, and the wholesale price of electricity, denoted by 𝑃!!, spikes to 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!. Hence, 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus are respectively given by 
  𝐶𝑆!! = 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑃!! 𝑄!",!! + 𝑄!"! + 𝑄!"!      (4) 
 
which is equal to 0 in the case of partial blackout (𝑃!! = 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!) 
   𝑃𝑆!! = 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝑄!",!! + 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝑄!"! +  𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝑄!"!      (5) 
 𝑇𝑆!!  ≡  𝐶𝑆!! + 𝑃𝑆!! = 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝑄!",!! + 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝑄!"! +  𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝑄!"!      (6) 
 
Abundant renewables 
If there is no blackout, the program then checks whether or not the renewable energy 
production alone suffices to cover demand. If it does, then the total electricity production is 
equal to renewable production. No electricity from base- or peak-load sources is dispatched 
and 𝑃!! = 𝑐!"! . We thus have in this case 
  𝐶𝑆!! = 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! − 𝑐!"! 𝐷!!     (7) 
 𝑃𝑆!! = 𝑐!"! 𝐷!! − 𝑄!",!!      (8) 
 𝑇𝑆!! = 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! ∙ 𝐷!! − 𝑐!"! ∙ 𝑄!",!!       (9) 
 
Excess electricity in this case is merely lost. The producers have no way of reducing 
renewable energy production below the stochastic realization and therefore cannot recover 
their costs in that period. While these costs will be the determinants of prices at the margin, 
we must say that neither in the calibration exercise nor under any plausible values of 
simulation parameters will we observe renewables as playing a pivotal role in price setting. 
Still, the value of 𝑐!"!  impacts the results of the model through the channel of welfare, which 
is determined by the consumers’ willingness-to-pay net of production costs.22 
 
In-between case 
In the "in-between case," some combination of base-load and peak-load generation units are 
used to cover demand. First, given the residual demand after dispatching renewable energy, 
the program computes the number of base-load plants that can operate at full-capacity among 
the available base-load plants. Then, it computes the cost of covering the residual volume, 
after dispatching renewable and these full capacity base-load plants, either with one 
additional base-load plant (subject to availability) or with peak-load electricity. This residual 
volume, denoted by 𝛥!! , is given by 
                                                      
22 Excitement about a peak in German renewable generation representing a high percentage of demand that even 
reached the business press is a good illustration of how much of a fringe case high renewable generation is 
(Shankleman, 2016). 
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 𝛥!! = 𝐷!! − 𝑄!",!! − 𝛼!𝑛!!      (10) 
 
where 𝑛!!  is the minimum of the number of base-load power plants that can be operated at full 
capacity and the number of available base-load plants. 
Note that by having checked for a partial blackout earlier, at this stage it is always 
possible to cover demand by dispatching all base-load and peak-load units. Since peak-load 
electricity has a higher marginal cost but base-load electricity only comes in lumps of 𝛼!, it is 
"more likely" that peak-load electricity is used to cover the residual if it is small relative to 
the production of one additional plant. But, it is "more likely" to bring online one additional 
base-load plant if it can operate at high capacity, i.e., if 𝛥!! 𝛼! is close to 1. Indeed, an 
additional available base-load plant will be dispatched if 
 𝛼!𝑐!"! < 𝛥!! 𝑐!"!      (11) 
 
In both cases, the market price for electricity is equal to the generation marginal cost, i.e., 𝑐!"!  
in the former case and 𝑐!"!  in the latter. Consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus 
are computed as in the partial blackout case of the no-trade situation described above and the 
results of this simple setup will serve as the benchmark against which we compare the 
outcome of the two-country trade we introduce next. 
 
3.3 The two-country trade case 
We now consider the setup where the first stage of national market clearing is followed by a 
second stage in which trade occurs. We assume that the electricity markets of Countries 𝐴 
and 𝐵 are linked through an interconnector with a maximum transmission capacity of 𝑄!. In 
each of the three cases of the first stage, two additional variables are introduced, namely, the 
amount of electricity that a country can offer for trade, 𝑉!!, and the price at which this 
electricity is offered, 𝑝𝑣!!. The values of these two variables depend on the first-stage result. 
In the case of partial blackout in Country 𝑖, it offers no electricity to sell. Hence, no 
export occurs from this capacity-constrained country so that 𝑉!! = 0 and 𝑝𝑣!! > max 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! .23 In the case of abundant renewable production, the difference 
between demand and production, i.e., the excess renewable energy that went to waste under 
autarky is now offered for export at a price equal to marginal cost. Hence, 𝑉!! = 𝐷!! − 𝑄!",!!  and 𝑝𝑣!! =  𝑐!"! . In the in-between case and when Country 𝑖 decides to dispatch one 
additional base-load power plant to operate at less than full capacity to cover residual 
demand, the excess electricity from this plant is offered at a price equal to its virtual marginal 
cost. Thus, 𝑉!! = (𝛼! − 𝛥!! ) and 𝑝𝑣!! =  𝑐!"! . If instead there is positive production of peak-
load electricity, the difference between the maximum peak-load capacity and the peak-load 
capacity used is offered in the market at a price equal to marginal cost. Formally, 𝑉!! =
                                                      
23 In the simulation presented in section 4, we set 𝑝𝑣!! to an arbitrarily chosen high value. 
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𝑄!"! − 𝛥!!  and 𝑝𝑣!! = 𝑐!"! . In the empirical analysis, the countries’ imports are denoted by 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡!, 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵 .  
There is a consequence of this program that is worthwhile pointing out here. Observe 
that in no case is a power plant ever turned online solely for the purpose of exporting 
electricity. Only residuals are exported. In practice, this could lead to an inefficiently low 
amount of trade, for example when one country only offers unused electricity from a base-
load plant but could in theory profitably dispatch peak-load electricity in addition. This 
constraint of the model does, however, mirror the market-coupling program described in 
section 2. 
After this first stage of production decision with simultaneous definition of export 
quantities and prices, each country checks its demand for electricity. If Country 𝐴’s market 
price is above the price at which Country 𝐵 offers to export, Country 𝐴 imports as much 
electricity as it can, constrained either by the interconnector capacity or the exporting 
country’s supply. Then, if imported electricity becomes "pivotal," the resulting price changes 
in the importing country are computed as well as the consumer, producer, and total surpluses 
as above.24 
For the very purpose of this article, we resort to a numerical approach to solve the 
model. Let us note that the model admits multiple solutions. Denote by 𝑃!,𝑃!  the pair of 
prices that prevail in Countries 𝐴 and 𝐵. Then, the total number of possible such pairs of prices, # 𝑃!,𝑃! , is given by  # 𝑃!,𝑃! = 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! × 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!   + 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"!   = 22 
(12) 
 
More explicitly, it is equal to 16 (4×4), the number of possible price pairs obtained by 
crossing the two sets 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!  and 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! , i.e.,  
 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ;𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! ;  𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! ,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! ; 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!, 𝑐!"! ; 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!, 𝑐!"! ;𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!, 𝑐!"! ; 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!,𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!  
 
(13) 
 
                                                      
24 The term "pivotal" is used here to indicate that it is the price of the imported electricity that effectively 
determines the price. Imports become pivotal if they allow to cover demand when there is a partial black-out or 
if they crowd-out a costlier technology from the energy mix in a given period.  
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to which the 6 pairs of prices corresponding to the cases where a price determined by one of 
the three technologies' cost carries over from one country to the another through trade, i.e.,  
 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"! ; 𝑐!"! , 𝑐!"!       (14) 
 
are added. In practice, depending on the cost parameters and the capacity of different 
technologies relative to demand, fewer combinations of prices will eventually emerge.25 
However, the outcome can be affected by the quantities traded in each iteration and depends 
on demand and production of electricity from renewable sources, both of which are assumed 
to be stochastic in the model. 
Further complexities militate for a numerical solution option. Indeed, the realization of 
the random variables in the first stage in which national market clearing occurs can lead to up 
to 16 different cases, each leading in the second stage either to no trade or trade in one or the 
other direction, subject to several constraints. The trade algorithm allows for possible 
"feedback effects" from the second stage to the first stage, e.g., when Country 𝐴 imports from 
Country 𝐵 so that the market price in Country 𝐴 decreases after accounting for trade and 
producer surplus in Country 𝐴 has to be adjusted downwards. 
 
3.4. A numerical example 
To further discuss the implications of the different cases presented above, we now consider a 
numerical example. Table 4 below lists the model’s variables that are country- and period- 
specific, the model’s parameters that are either only country-specific or common to the two 
countries, and their designations. Let us assume the following values for the parameters of the 
model: 
 𝑐!"! = 𝑐!"! = 0.1;  𝑐!"! = 1.1, 𝑐!"! = 1.0;  𝑐!"! = 2.2, 𝑐!"! = 2.0;  𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! =  𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿! = 10     (15) 
 𝑁! = 𝑁! = 10;  𝛼! = 𝛼! = 250;  𝑄!"! = 𝑄!"! = 500     (16) 
 𝑄!"! ~𝐹 0,400 ,𝐷!~𝐺 2700, 300 , 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵      (17) 
 
where 𝐹 and 𝐺 are the cumulative functions of the uniform and normal distributions 
respectively. While in this example we model the production of electricity from renewable 
technology and demand as random variables following the uniform and normal distributions 
respectively, in the next section we fit actual data on these variables to linear functions. We 
further assume that the maximum transmission capacity on the interconnector that links the 
electricity markets of Countries 𝐴 and 𝐵 is equal to 100 MWh, i.e., 𝑄! = 100. To simulate 
the solution and approximate the welfare levels associated with these parameter values, we 
run 1,000,000 iterations of the model.26 Table A.1, given in the appendix, reports the 
                                                      
25 The numerical example provided in the next section will produce only 12 different price pairs. 
26 These simulation results have been obtained with a seed of a random number generator that allows for 
replication. The program used is available from the authors upon request. 
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minimum, the first quartile, the median, the mean, the third quartile, and the maximum values 
of variables of the model the designations of which are given in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 - Variables and parameters of the model+  
Variable/Parameter Designation 𝑄!"!  Electricity production with renewable technology in country i (MWh) 𝐹, 𝑓  Cumulative distribution and density of the renewable technology 𝑐!"!  Per-unit cost of the renewable technology (€/MWh) 𝑄!"!  Electricity production with base-load technology in country i (MWh) 𝑁! Total number of base-load plants in country i 𝛼! Electricity generation per base-load plant in country i (MWh) 𝑛!"!  Number of active base-load plants in country i 𝑄!"!  Max. electricity production with base-load technology in country i (MWh) 𝑐!"!  Per-unit cost of the base-load technology (€/MWh) 𝑄!"!  Electricity production with peak-load technology in country i (MWh) 𝑐!"!  Per-unit cost of the peak-load technology (€/MWh) 𝑄!"!  Max. electricity production with peak-load technology in country i (MWh) 𝐷! Demand for electricity in country i (MWh).  𝐺,𝑔  Cumulative distribution and density of demand for electricity  𝑄! Max. production capacity in country i (MWh) 𝑄! Total electricity production in country i (MWh) 𝑃! Price of electricity in country i (€/MWh) 𝐶𝑆! Consumer surplus in country i (€ equivalent) 𝑃𝑆! Producer surplus in country i (€ equivalent) 𝑇𝑆! Total surplus in country i (€ equivalent) 𝛥! Residual volume not covered by rw and full capacity bl in country i (MWh) 𝑛! Min. {# full-capacity base-load plants, # available base-load plants}  𝑏𝑚𝐶𝑆! Consumer surplus before trade (benchmark) in country i (€ equivalent) 𝑏𝑚𝑃𝑆! Producer surplus before trade (benchmark) in country i (€ equivalent) 𝑏𝑚𝑇𝑆! Total surplus before trade (benchmark) in country i (€ equivalent) 𝑏𝑚𝑃! Price of electricity before trade (benchmark) in country i (€/MWh) 𝑄! Interconnector capacity (MWh) 𝑉! Surplus electricity available for trade in country i (MWh) 𝑝𝑣! Price at which electricity is offered by country i for trade (€/MWh) 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡! Imports of country i (MWh) 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙! Difference between domestic electricity demand and capacity when  
domestic demand exceeds capacity (before trade) in country i 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡!! Dichotomous indicator of a peak at period 𝑡 in country i 𝑏𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡!! Dichotomous indicator of a peak at period 𝑡 before trade (benchmark)  
in country i 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! Total number of peak periods in country i (sum over 𝑡 of 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡!!) 𝑏𝑚𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! Total number of peak periods before trade (benchmark) in country i  
(sum over 𝑡 of 𝑏𝑚𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡!!) 
+ For simplicity of presentation, for each of the variables of the model the superscript i indicating the country is kept, 
but the subscript t indicating the period is dropped, except for period indicators for blackout. 
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It is worthwhile noting that most entries in Table A.1 are of a descriptive nature, 
reporting some statistics of the variables and parameters listed in Table 4. Some of these 
variables are more important for the computations within the model, but not for the 
interpretation of the outcome, for example 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙!, which describes the difference 
between domestic production and domestic demand before trade whenever the latter exceeds 
the former. The prefix "bm", used as an abbreviation for "benchmark", designates values of a 
variable measured before trade to allow comparison of the values of this variable before and 
after trade. This is particularly the case of the couples of variables 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! , 𝑏𝑚𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! , 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵 , given in Table A.2, that inform us about the number 
of on-peak periods before trade and after the model has been computed with trade and hence 
allow us to compare them. However, for the purpose of this article, the most relevant values 
to compare are the couples of variables corresponding to consumer surplus, producer surplus, 
and total surplus. 
As can be seen from Table A.1, the stochastic variables 𝑄!"!  and 𝐷!, 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵  behave as 
expected given the values assumed for the first and second moments of their distributions. 
The base-load plants run almost always at full capacity of 2,500 MWh in both countries with 
mean volume of 2,375 MWh (See the columns of 𝑄!"! , 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵 ). Prices 𝑃!, 𝑖𝜖 𝐴,𝐵  vary 
between 1, the unit-price of base-load electricity in Country 𝐵, and 10, the value of 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿, 
which has been fixed at the same value for both countries in this example. To get a further 
idea of the accuracy of the simulations, one can compare the relative occurrence of each case 
to the probability determined by the distributions and the program. Table A.3 shows the 
frequency of the pairs of observed prices, 𝑃!,𝑃! , after trade occurs. Each cell reports the 
number of times the corresponding pair of prices occurred in the 1,000,000 iterations. This 
table shows, e.g., that in 3,590 of the 1,000,000 cases we obtain (10,10), i.e., a simultaneous 
partial blackout.27 
Indeed, comparing the levels of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and total surplus 
under the benchmark situation without trade with the levels attained under trade, i.e., 𝑏𝑚𝐶𝑆, 𝑏𝑚𝑃𝑆, and 𝑏𝑚𝑇𝑆 versus 𝐶𝑆, 𝑃𝑆, and 𝑇𝑆 allows us to assess the welfare effects of trade in 
each country. As shown in the corresponding columns of Table A.1, in the simulation of the 
model, trade increased the average level of consumer surplus in both countries. It appears 
then that, overall, trade has unambiguously, though not surprisingly, benefited consumers in 
both countries. 
The situation is however not that unambiguous when it comes to producer surplus. We 
found that in Country 𝐴 the introduction of trade decreased average producer surplus. In 
Country 𝐵, the introduction of trade also decreased average producer surplus. When we 
examine the aggregate effect of trade, we see that all the statistics of total surplus increase 
consecutive to trade as can be seen from Table A.1. Based on these results, it seems 
reasonable to say that, globally, while trade has increased the sum of consumers’ and 
producers’ surpluses in both countries, it did not result in a Pareto welfare improvement for 
consumers and producers. 
                                                      
27 The interested reader might want to compute the probabilities of ending up in each of the twelve cases shown 
in Table A.4. 
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What seems to be happening is the following. Country 𝐴 tends to import more 
electricity than Country 𝐵, which is to be expected given its higher cost for all technologies. 
From Table A.1, we see that in each period, Country 𝐴 imports on average 45.03 MWh and 
uses the full 100 MWh capacity of the interconnector in more than three-quarters of all 
periods as can be seen from the 3rd quartile of the distribution. Country 𝐵 imports only 12.6 
MWh on average and nothing at all in most periods, although in some periods Country B also 
makes use of the full capacity of the interconnector by importing 100 MWh. In Country 𝐴, 
the imports will only benefit consumers when cheaper foreign electricity is pivotal or 
alleviates a blackout. If, however, transmission capacity is small, this will rarely be the 
case.28 In these cases, it follows from the description of the model that producer surplus in 
Country 𝐴 may fall if the producers now sell less electricity from a base-load plant without 
being able to shut it off and decrease their costs, wasting electricity. Aggregate welfare in 
Country 𝐴 might then be lower because producers have the same costs, less revenue, and no 
domestic party can appropriate any of the gains from trade. Only the exporting industry of 
Country 𝐵 will enjoy a benefit, limited as it is by transmission capacity. Overall, Country 𝐵’s 
producers can lose too, because whenever trade can prevent a partial blackout in this country, 
its producers lose some of their most profitable periods. 
The overall effect is a shift in welfare from producers to consumers. For example, 
average consumer surplus per period in Country 𝐴 rises from 20,318 € to 20,909 € and in 
Country 𝐵 from 20,767 € to 21,349 €, which represent an increase of 2.8 and 2.9%, 
respectively. Meanwhile, average producer surplus per period decreases from 3,671.9 € to 
3,123.9 € in Country 𝐴 and from 3,484.6 € to 2,983.2 € in Country 𝐵, i.e., by 14% and 15%, 
respectively. The overall change in total surplus is positive in both countries, although small. 
As can be seen from Table A.1, average total surplus per period increases from 23,990 € to 
24,033 € in Country 𝐴 and from 24,251 € to 24,332 € in Country B, i.e., by 0.18% and 
0.33%, respectively. The change on a period-by-period basis can be relatively large for 
producers but tends to be relatively small for consumers. This is so because in most periods 
producers make only small inframarginal rents so that the partial blackouts are relatively 
"valuable" while consumer surplus does not vary as much across off-peak periods for the 
chosen values of the parameters, in particular, a willingness-to-pay, expressed through 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!, 
which is much higher than the production cost.29 
                                                      
28 The meaning of the term "small" in this context depends on the size and variability of demand and production. 
In the periods with the greatest discrepancy between domestic demand and domestic production, reported as 
the maximum of the variable 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙!, this discrepancy approximately represents a volume of 1,000 MWh, 
which is ten times as high as the capacity of the interconnector. 
29 In some cases, trade increases total surplus for both countries individually and collectively. Take the case 
when one country produces more base-load electricity than it uses. This electricity would be wasted under 
autarky. When it is sold, producers in this country gain additional revenue at no additional cost. The importing 
country might use this electricity to overcome a shortfall in electricity and move from being “on-peak”, to 
prices equal to the cost of peak-load electricity generation. Producers in the importing country lose revenue, 
first, because prices fall from the willingness-to-pay to the price of producing peak-load electricity and second, 
as they reduce peak-load electricity generation. Consumers in the importing country fully appropriate the 
welfare loss of producers in the importing country from falling prices as their own surplus. Additionally, they 
gain surplus from all the additional electricity that is now consumed but would not have been consumed under 
autarky. This quantity can be larger than the quantity by which producers in the importing country reduce their 
production. 
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The model is generally well-behaved and changes in key parameters have a predictable 
impact on final outcomes. Notably, changes to 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿!  result in changes to consumer welfare 
that are linear in the quantity consumed in off-peak periods and changes to producer welfare 
that are linear in the quantity produced in on-peak periods. Variations in the cost spread 
between base-load and peak-load electricity have a smaller impact, which is directly related 
to the proportion of base-load electricity sold in a country in periods when prices are above 
the cost of producing base-load electricity in that country. The proportion of such periods 
depends in turn on the realizations of demand and renewable energy, as well as the 
parameters that govern the “lumpiness” of base-load electricity (number of plant and 
production per plant). 
 
4. Application to UK-France trade 
In the introduction of this article we have directed attention to the fact that British officials 
have publicly claimed that the UK values access to the IEM. Can we quantify the worth of 
access to the IEM to the UK? This is the question we seek to explore next by calibrating the 
model developed in the previous section using data on the UK and France. 
Let us assume that the trading countries in the model developed in Section 3, Countries 𝐴 and 𝐵, are the UK and France respectively. Now, the resolution algorithm works exactly as 
already described but, to better reflect the case of the UK-France trade, instead of inputting 
random realizations of renewable source electricity generation and total electricity demand as 
drawn from the distributions 𝐹 and 𝐺, we use the fitted values of dependent variables 
obtained from regressions of observed renewable source electricity generation and total 
demand for electricity on time of day and month. By doing so, our purpose is not to 
accurately predict the dependent variables but rather to capture the seasonal and daily 
movements of electricity produced from renewable source and demand in order to give the 
model a more realistic backdrop. One factor to keep in mind when simulating hourly trade 
decisions between the UK and France is that these countries are in different time zones. In 
fact, this is interesting from a trade analysis perspective as, e.g., shifting the lunch and dinner 
time peaks by one hour is a way by which electricity demand in the two countries is "de-
correlated" and increases possibilities for gains from trade. 
When deciding how to translate other pieces of data reflecting the Britain and French 
context and incorporating them in the set parameters of the model, we have to emphasize that 
we evaluate gains from electricity trade by comparing total welfare under trade between these 
two countries and total welfare under no trade. However, this estimate must be taken only as 
an initial estimate that will be made more accurate as richer and more realistic data get 
incorporated in the model. In particular, given the reality of the electricity trade between the 
UK and the rest of Europe, as described in Section 2, our framework should be generalized 
from one to several interconnectors and account for the fact that the electricity markets of 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are fully integrated. Concentrating however on 
the French-British trade allows us to get a lower bound of the UK’s stake in trading its 
electricity within the IEM.30 Let us now discuss in turn the data sources, the way we 
                                                      
30 This work thus suggests that an approach that combines calibration of a theoretical model and its simulation 
might prove useful to explore relevant policy questions concerning a given sector (see also Geske et al., 2019). 
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categorize the electricity production technologies and set some other important parameters of 
the model, the regressions we use to capture the monthly and hourly patterns of demand and 
renewable electricity generation, and the simulation results that help us provide answers to 
the questions posed above. 
Our main source of data is the website gridwatch.templar.co.uk, which offers free data 
sets of electricity demand and generation from different sources for the British and French 
electricity networks. Their source of data, in turn, is the French TSO RTE France for the 
French data and Elexon, the provider of the "Balancing and Settlement Code", for the UK 
supplemented by live data from the University of Sheffield for data on solar power 
generation. For the UK, data are available in 5-minute intervals while for France they are 
available in 15-minute intervals. Even though data are available going back as far as 2009 for 
the UK and 2014 for France, we decided to confine ourselves to 2016 data. This way, we 
avoid dealing with macro trends for demand and get a consistent view on a recent set of 
plants, while retaining a sufficiently large number of observations, more specifically, over 
35,000 for France and over 100,000 for the UK, to get reliable demand estimates. 
For each point in time, the data set provides information on demand and contribution of 
different electricity sources and interconnectors, which can be positive or negative, as well as 
the frequency in the grid. For France, the data set reports electricity production from oil, coal, 
gas, nuclear, wind, solar, hydro, pumped storage, and biomass. It also provides in/out flows 
from/to Germany, England, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland. For the UK, the data set 
reports production from coal, nuclear, combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), wind, pumped, 
hydro, oil, open cycle gas turbines (OCGT), solar and others, as well as in/out flows from/to 
France, the Netherlands, the East-West Interconnector (between Britain and Ireland), and the 
Irish interconnector (Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland). The calibration of the theoretical 
model requires two steps to which we turn next. First, we need to categorize each sort of 
electricity into the three technologies assumed in the model, namely, renewable, base-load, 
and peak-load. Second, we need to characterize the patterns of renewable energy and demand 
in the UK and France. 
Given the different technologies, we categorize all renewable, low marginal cost 
sources, namely, wind, solar, hydro, pumped, and, in the case of France, biomass as 
renewables in the sense of our model. In fact, electricity in pumped storage is technically not 
renewable as in this case it is water that is pumped into reservoirs at times of excess 
electricity and used to produce hydroelectricity in times of scarcity. As such, we would 
expect it to be countercyclical and to move against other sources of renewable energy. Table 
A.4 reports the correlation coefficients between different kinds of renewable energy and 
pumped energy production levels in the energy mix of the UK and France as observed in the 
data. Given that the correlation between the supply of pumped energy and other types of 
technologies is positive, with the exception of wind energy in France, we decide to aggregate 
pumped energy into the renewable energy category. 
An important issue is how to categorize the other fuel-based technologies. While 
nuclear is a clear candidate for base-load, due to its lumpiness, high start-up costs, and low 
per-unit costs, some large and efficient coal power plants run permanently as part of the base-
load electricity mix as well. This is a problem of aggregation in the data, as they do not allow 
us to distinguish between large and small plants. We tackle this problem by examining the 
 22 
variation of the electricity produced from each of the non-renewable sources. Figures A.1 
through A.8 show the fluctuation in the generation of electricity from each of these sources in 
five-minute intervals for the UK and in fifteen-minute intervals for France. The examination 
of these data leads us to decide to classify only nuclear as base-load and all other sources of 
electricity as peak-load technology because of their very reactive and variable production 
throughout the year. For example, for the French time series, the overall standard deviation of 
nuclear electricity generation is 7,033 MWh relative to a mean of 43,475, while coal and gas 
have standard deviations close to 728 MWh relative to a mean of 813 MWh and 2,404 MWh 
relative to a mean of 4,074 MWh respectively. The UK time series exhibits similar dispersion 
features. 
Indeed, a first look at Figures A.1-A.8 suggests that the similarity in shape between the 
fossil technologies and the nuclear electricity doesn't justify classifying anything as base-load 
apart from nuclear, even though it should be noted that, e.g., the contribution of French gas in 
winter and fall (the first and last periods) almost never falls below 2,000 MWh as can be seen 
from Figure A.7. Note that the one-day figures are almost stacked on top of each other so that 
intra-day variations become very apparent. Figures A.3 and A.4 show that in the UK CCGT 
generation is typically in the 10-20,000 MWh levels while OCGT generation is negligibly 
small in the vicinity of 0-200 MWh. 
Instead of relying on data from separate sources on theoretically installed capacity, we 
set the maximum capacity of nuclear power for each country simply equal to the observed 
maximum in the data set. These maxima are given by 8,868 MWh and 59,289 MWh for 
France and the UK respectively. We then divide these maxima by the number of nuclear 
reactors obtained from the World Nuclear Association, namely, 15 for the UK and 58 for 
France, to obtain the value of the electricity generation per base-load (nuclear) plant, 𝛼, as 
592 MWh for the UK and 1,022 MWh for France.31 For the number of base-load plants 𝑁, 
we set it to 15 for the UK and 58 for France. Consequently, the full base-load capacity in our 
simulation is 8,880 for the UK and 59,276 for France. The interconnector linking the UK and 
France is assumed to have a capacity 𝑄! of 2,000 MWh, a volume corresponding to most 
observations of electricity transmitted over it. 
For the capacity of peak-load, 𝑄!", one could simply take the maximum production for 
each of the technologies defined as peak-load and add them up. This would yield values of 
43,926 MWh for the UK and 15,294 MWh for France. Using these figures, there would not 
be a single hour where demand exceeds capacity. However, this would lead to errors if we 
don't take into account the electricity flows from other interconnectors and other sources, that 
is, the whole information in the data set. It would be akin to over-fitting our model to the part 
of the data that is closely represented in the model while ignoring important complementary 
information that is less relevant to the model. Also, we have to consider the fact that in the 
data set some demand spikes are extremely high and exceed the highest observed levels 
generation at any point. These few demand peaks are mitigated in the linear regressions we 
perform. Since we are more interested in the effect of trade on welfare, and that mostly means 
                                                      
31 Information retrieved from the UK and France profiles as published in the Website of the World Nuclear 
Association (https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles.aspx) on July 30, 2019.  
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prices, we will use the peak-load capacity to fine-tune the model to different numbers of 
blackouts. 
We ask how many periods there are in the data where demand exceeds domestic 
electricity generation and how many periods are there when demand exceeds domestic 
electricity generation plus imports from the other country. In the data set, electricity demand 
is higher than production plus imports in 4,392 out of 35,067 periods in France and 71,277 
out of 104,859 periods in the UK. Especially for the UK, but also for France, these numbers 
are very high if they were interpreted as on-peak periods. If this information were accurate, it 
would mean that there were 1,098 on-peak hours in France and 5,939.75 in the UK out of a 
total of 8,784 hours in 2016. As this seems to overestimate the number of on-peak periods 
and hence the effects of trade, we adjust the capacity for the peak-load technology to directly 
determine how many periods with blackout there would be without trade. We vary the 
number over a conservative range of scenarios that remain below the number of implied on-
peak periods in the data. Since the base-load capacity, renewable production, and demand are 
known at this stage, we can adjust peak-load capacity to the effect we want. We chose the 
high values taken from the data, namely, 15,294 MWh and 43,926 MWh, as upper limits and 
then vary through lower values that consecutively give us higher numbers of blackouts. 
The prices cannot be directly observed from our data set. As mentioned earlier, the UK 
is a big net importer of electricity and this strongly suggests that costs are higher in the UK 
than in France. There is scant information about the short-run marginal costs for different 
energy sources in each country. Most data sources report levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), 
a measure that takes into account capital costs and describes the minimum price at which 
electricity has to sell for a plant to break-even over its lifetime. This measure is useful for 
decision makers who have to decide whether investing in capacity of a certain technology 
will be profitable. It is less relevant to a bidder deciding at which market price to operate a 
plant. The World Nuclear Association (2018) suggests that the UK generally faces higher 
generation costs than France for all technologies. However, it is not clear if that only includes 
capital costs or also fuel costs. The International Energy Agency (2010) provides information 
only from 2010 and fails to deliver much information on the UK. In contrast, it provides 
information on fuel cost for France that is also given by the World Nuclear Association and 
on the general pattern of trade with the UK being a big importer.  
These different sources of information suggest that in the UK costs are slightly higher 
than in France. This led us to choosing base-load per unit cost, 𝑐!", of 12.4667 €/MWh for 
France in 2010.32 For the UK, we added 5% in the baseline model and used then the figure of 
13.09 €/MWh. We set fuel costs for renewables, 𝑐!", to zero even though this is not entirely 
accurate for biomass as for the latter the cost is much smaller than for wind and solar. As to 
peak-load technologies, since they seem to be used at the same time, we set their cost, 𝑐!", 
using the reported cost of gas fueled electricity generation, which averages at about 
60 €/MWh for CCGT in the European countries. We therefore set the cost of peak-load at 
                                                      
32 This figure is for 2010. Thus, given that our analysis is for 2016, an issue that we should have dealt with is the 
effect of inflation. However, we refrained from adjusting for price changes as the GDP deflator might not 
accurately reflect changes in natural gas and uranium prices and commodity price changes may or may not 
accurately represent fuel prices that plant owners face.  
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60 €/MWh for France and 63 €/MWh, again assuming the 5% cost gap between the UK and 
France. 
Actual demand for electricity depends on the seasons and the daily life of consumers. 
Electricity demand is clearly relatively higher in the evening and around noon and in the cold 
seasons. Figures A.9 and A.10 illustrates the patterns of electricity demand in the first week 
of January for the UK and France. One way to extract these patterns is to run regressions of 
demand on dummy variables representing each hour of the day and each month. The same is 
true for renewable energy generation. For country 𝑖𝜖 𝑈𝐾,𝐹𝑅  and its corresponding couple 
of data samples 𝐷!! !!!,⋯,! and  𝑅𝑊!! !!!,⋯,!, where 𝐷!! and 𝑅𝑊!! are respectively country 𝑖’s electricity demand and renewable source electricity generation in observation 𝑡, we 
specify an econometric equation of the form 
 𝑌!! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!!𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!! +!"!!! 𝛾!! 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"! +!"!!! 𝜀!    (16) 
 
where, neglecting the observation index 𝑡, 𝑌! represents either country 𝑖’s total electricity 
demand, 𝐷!, or renewable source electricity generation, 𝑅𝑊!, 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!! , ℎ = 2, 3,⋯ , 24 are 
dichotomous dummy variables representing the hour spans 1: 00𝑎𝑚 − 1: 59𝑎𝑚, 2: 00𝑎𝑚 −2: 59𝑎𝑚,⋯ , 11: 00𝑝𝑚 − 11: 59𝑝𝑚, and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!! , 𝑚 = 2, 3,⋯ , 12 are dichotomous dummy 
variables corresponding to the months February, March, …, December.33 
In the estimation, we adjusted all French time stamps by one hour to account for the 
fact that the UK and France are in different time zones. Tables A.5 through A.8 show the 
results of regressing hourly electricity demand and renewable source electricity generation on 
hour and month dummies for the UK and France. As expected, the estimation results are 
satisfactory. In the demand equation for the UK, out of the 35 coefficients associated with the 
hour and month dummies, all but the one of 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!", i.e., the hour 1: 00𝑎𝑚 − 1: 59𝑎𝑚 are 
significant at a 5% level. In this country’s renewable source electricity generation, out of the 
35 coefficients, all but the ones of 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!", 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!", 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!", 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!", and 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!", i.e., 
respectively, the hours 1: 00𝑎𝑚 − 1: 59𝑎𝑚, 2: 00𝑎𝑚 − 2: 59𝑎𝑚, 3: 00𝑎𝑚 − 3: 59𝑎𝑚, 4: 00𝑎𝑚 − 4: 59𝑎𝑚, and 5: 00𝑎𝑚 − 5: 59𝑎𝑚 are significant. As to the regressions 
concerning France, in both regressions all the 35 coefficients associated with the hour and 
month dummies are significant a 5% level.34 
We have seen in the numerical example presented in the previous section that the main 
effect of trade in the model is a shift in welfare from producers to consumers. As a base-case, 
we set peak-load capacity very high so that we observe no blackouts before trade. Then, we 
consider 10 cases where we reduce the capacity in France, 10 cases where we reduce the 
capacity in the UK, and 10 cases where we simultaneously reduce the capacity in both 
                                                      
33 The baseline hour and month are 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!  and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!!  respectively corresponding to the hour  00: 00𝑎𝑚 −00: 59𝑎𝑚 and the month of January. The dichotomous variable 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!! , ℎ = 2, 3,⋯ , 24, takes on the value 1 
if the observation 𝑡 is in the hour ℎ and 0 if it is in any of the other hours of the day. Similarly, the variable 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"! , 𝑚 = 2, 3,⋯ , 12 takes on the value 1 if the observation 𝑡 is in the month 𝑚 and 0 if it is in any of 
the other months of the year. 
34 We should add that a visual comparison of the actual demand in the first week of 2016 given in Figures A.9 
and A.10 and the predicted values from the fitted regressions shown in Figures A.11 and A.12 shows that the 
model fits the patterns well.  
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countries. Each step will be just large enough to satisfy electricity demand in one less state of 
the world, each state of the world occurring 28 to 31 times since it is determined by hour of 
the day and month. 
Now, to answer our original question, i.e., what the value to the UK of its membership 
in the IEM is, we first take the difference between the mean of total welfare per period before 
and after trade to obtain the average welfare improvement per hour brought by trade and then 
scale it to the length of the year by multiplying it by 8,784 in a leap year like 2016 and by 
8,760 in a regular year. Table 5 gives the results. Each cell of this table reports the increase of 
total welfare in the UK following trade in 30 scenarios. As indicated, each scenario 
corresponds to a combination of one of 10 numbers (0 through 9) of partial blackouts no-
trade (benchmark) situation and one of three cases, namely, the case in which we adjust UK’s 
peak-load capacity only to induce between 0 and 9 hour/month-combinations with on-peak 
prices under autarky, the case in which we only adjust France’s peak-load capacity, and the 
case in which we adjust both UK’s and France’s capacities. 
 
Table 5 - UK gains from trade+ 
Peak-load K adjust 
# of partial blackouts 
(autarky) 
UK only France only UK and France 
simultaneously  
0 2,310,480.82 2,310,480.82 2,310,480.82 
1 2,522,997.76 2,124,502.53 2,337,019.47 
2 2,681,862.92 1,969,999.75 2,341,381.86 
3 50,375,371.16 1,796,683.38 49,861,573.71 
4 177,963,781.74 1,613,500.74  177,266,801.65 
5 268,715,312.37 1,440,906.66 267,845,738.21 
6  288,605,702.78 1,305,498.66 287,713,612.09 
7 446,553,135.46 1,311,667.78 445,687,208.89 
8 521,680,666.65 1,443,727.78 520,949,683.08 
9 634,157,471.71 1,459,723.78 914,559,269.97 
+ Units are 2016 €. 
 
We see from Table 5 that for the UK, when we vary the number of national capacity 
shortages from 0 to 9, the gains from trade increases by 634,157,471.71 €. In the case of the 
simultaneously varied peak-load capacity, gains from trade go up to 914,559,269.97 €. In the 
case where the UK can always nationally satisfy its electricity demand, but France cannot, 
total welfare gains through trading for the UK go only as high as 1,459,723.78 €. This is 
consistent with the observation that gains from trade occur largely to consumers. Figures 
A.13, A.16, and A.19 report the percent change in total surplus for each country from 
introducing trade as a function of the number of partial blackouts that would happen without 
trade.35 Figures A.14, A.15, A.17, A.18, A.20, and A.21 show the percentage change in 
consumer and producer surplus for the UK and France in the three situations. Notably, the 
decrease in producer surplus after trade is relatively high, e.g., between 40 and 60% for the 
UK in the scenario where UK capacity is adjusted (see Figure A.15). In one scenario, the 
                                                      
35 As an illustration, at the point 𝑥, 𝑦 = 3, 0.91044  of the red line in Figure A.14, the UK sees its consumer 
surplus increase by 0.9% through trade when its peak-load capacity is sufficient to cover all but the three states 
of the world with the highest demand. 
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decrease is even greater than 80 %. The change in consumer welfare after trade is much 
smaller because consumer surplus in most periods is much closer to the value of 𝑉𝑜𝐿𝐿, set at 
20,000 €, which is much lower than production cost. For example, as can be seen in Figure 
A.20, the increase in consumer surplus in the scenario where capacity in both countries is 
simultaneously adjusted remains below 4 %. Still, the overall effect of trade on total surplus 
is positive in any case. In a nutshell, assuming that trade alleviates scarcity in some high-
demand periods in the UK, a reasonable ballpark estimate of the gains from electricity trade 
for the UK is in the range of 600 M€ - 900 M€. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article introduces a model of an electricity market with peak-load pricing, inelastic 
demand, and perfect competition to study through simulations the welfare effect of trade 
between two countries. Under some assumptions on willingness-to-pay and other key 
parameters of the model, we find that producers make inframarginal and scarcity rents, but 
that trade diminishes them whenever it becomes pivotal in the price determination process or 
alleviates scarcity. As a result, gains from trade largely accrue to consumers. The model is 
then calibrated to data on the UK and France and simulated to estimate the value of the 
European IEM for the UK. We find that the answer depends on how many hours there are 
during which trade alleviates scarcity in the UK, which is an electricity importer as often as it 
nationally faces excess demand given its production capacity. Letting the number of states of 
the world in which there is excess demand vary between 0 and 9, or roughly from 0 to 270 
peak hours, the annual gains from trade are in the 0-175 M€ range at 4 states of the world 
with excess demand to well over 900 M€ in the case of 9 states of the world where demand 
exceeds capacity in both France and the UK. While these figures are instructive, they should 
be taken with caution for at least the following reasons.  
First, we assume inelastic demand yet, even though private consumers may not react to 
daily changes in price, large industrial consumers might realistically do. While under inelastic 
demand lower prices do not increase the quantity traded and, thus, most gains from trade 
occur when imports alleviate a capacity shortage, introducing elastic demand would increase 
welfare gains whenever trade decreases price in the importing country. Second, in our model 
consumer surplus depends on wholesale prices whereas in reality many consumers pay 
fixed/flat rates for electricity. Two factors however speak in favor of our assumption. One 
can think of electricity retail companies and final consumers as one economic agent, focusing 
on the final consumer benefit from using electricity and the retailer’s cost of purchasing it 
and regarding the retail price scheme as a transfer between the two that should not impact the 
total consumer welfare under efficient contracting. More importantly, retail prices paid by 
consumers should reflect wholesale prices at large provided that the retail market for 
electricity is competitive. In such circumstances, retailers should on average break even and 
thus if international trade lowers wholesale prices, these price drops should be passed on to 
prices paid by consumers. 
Despite these caveats, this article has presented a useful tool for policy analysis that is 
also open to extensions. The possibility to assign environmental costs to peak-load 
production is certainly a promising avenue of future research. Future research could also 
explore the beneficial effects of changing the dispatch plan at the second stage of this model, 
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thus emulating a truly integrated European market where all electricity-generating assets are 
used most efficiently to satisfy aggregate demand instead of just realizing trade opportunities 
after each market has cleared. This could lead to a better utilization rate of cheaper and less 
flexible nuclear plants as well as a reduction from fossil fuel plants’ pollution. An extension 
to trade among more than two countries would also be a natural extension that could increase 
the accuracy of the model. Additionally, loop-flow considerations that are an important issue 
in Europe would need to be taken into account. Nevertheless, in spite of these open flanks 
and qualifications, the model can serve as a stepping-stone towards the study of market 
coupling. 
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Appendix - Tables and Figures 
 
Table A.1 - Simulation results 
Statistic 𝐷! 𝐷! 𝑄!"!  𝑄!"!  𝑄!"!  
Min. 1,315 1,212 0.0004 0.0004 1,000 
1st Qu. 2,497 2,497 99.9046 100.5058 2,250 
Median 2,700 2,700 200.0305 200.2806 2,500 
Mean 2,700 2,700 200.0191 200.1716 2,375 
3rd Qu. 2,903 2,902 300.1887 299.9114 2,500 
Max. 4,375 4,158 399.9993 399.9998 2,500 
Statistic 𝑄!"!  𝑄!"!  𝑄!"!  𝑄! 𝑄! 
Min. 1,000 0.00 0.00 1,333 1,249 
1st Qu. 2,250 0.00 0.00 2,538 2,535 
Median 2,500 0.00 82.91 2,724 2,739 
Mean 2,375 93.59 131.50 2,713 2,719 
3rd Qu. 2,500 158.22 215.28 2,909 2,925 
Max. 2,500 500.00 500.00 3,400 3,400 
Statistic 𝑃! 𝑃! 𝐶𝑆! 𝐶𝑆! 𝑃𝑆! 
Min. 1.100 1.000 0 0 -136.3  
1st Qu. 1.100 1.000 20,216 20,644 368.3  
Median 2.200 2.000 21,884 22,342 2,890.5  
Mean 2.168 2.004 20,909 21,349 3,123.9  
3rd Qu. 2.200 2.000 23,143 23,620 3,179.7 
Max. 10.00 10.00 27,267 27,788 30,108.7 
Statistic 𝑃𝑆! 𝑇𝑆! 𝑇𝑆! 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡! 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡! 
Min. -123.5  11,915 11,097 0.00 0.0 
1st Qu. 370.7  22,398 22,702 0.00 0.0 
Median 2,673.5  24,164 24,463  36.43 0.0 
Mean 2,983.2  24,033 24,332 45.03 12.6 
3rd Qu. 2,949.0 25,840 26,135 100.00 0.0 
Max. 30,459.4 30,852 31,193 100.00 100.0 
Statistic 𝑉! 𝑉! 𝑝𝑣! 𝑝𝑣! 𝑏𝑚𝐶𝑆! 
Min. 0.00   0.00   1.100 1.000 0 
1st Qu. 65.45 65.61 1.100 1.000 20,002 
Median 240.52  240.61  2.200 2.000 21,747 
Mean 238.36  238.52 4.294 4.099 20,318 
3rd Qu. 411.14  411.17  2.200 2.000 23,010 
Max. 500.00 500.00 42.000 42.000 26,498 
Statistic 𝑏𝑚𝐶𝑆! 𝑏𝑚𝑃𝑆! 𝑏𝑚𝑃𝑆! 𝑏𝑚𝑇𝑆! 𝑏𝑚𝑇𝑆! 
Min. 0 -136.3  -124.1  11,915 11,097 
1st Qu. 20,426 297.2  266.3  22,349 22,588 
Median 22,209 2,892.3  2,627.7  24,129 24,387  
Mean 20,767 3,671.9  3,484.6  23,990 24,251 
3rd Qu. 23,490 3,186.6 2,894.0 25,815 26,097 
Max. 27,188 30,108.7 30,459.9 30,109 30,460 
Statistic 𝑏𝑚𝑃! 𝑏𝑚𝑃! 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙! 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙! 𝑛!"!  
Min. 1.100 1.000 0.00 0.000   3.00 
1st Qu. 1.100 1.000 0.00 0.000   9.00 
Median 2.200 2.000 0.00 0.000 10.00 
Mean 2.355 2.188 8.29 8.204   9.21 
3rd Qu. 2.200 2.000 0.00 0.000 10.00 
Max. 10.000 10.000 1,185.30 950.623 10.00 
Statistic 𝑛!"!      
Min.   3.000     
1st Qu.   9.000     
Median   9.000     
Mean   9.209     
3rd Qu. 10.000     
Max. 10.000     
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Table A.2 - Blackout occurrence 
Occurrence 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! 𝑏𝑚𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! 𝑏𝑚𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡! 
Yes   36,716   36,352   60,603   59,733 
No 963,284 963,648 939,397 940,267 
Total 1000,000 1000,000 1000,000 1000,000 
 
Table A.3 - Cross-distribution of countries’ prices 
Country B 
Country A 
1 2 2.2 10 Total 
1.1 84,000 192,873 0 12,368 289,241 
2.2 193,685 441,642 18,322 20,394 674,043 
10 12,302 20,824 0 3,590 36,716 
Total 289,987 655,339 18,322 36,352 1,000,000 
 
Table A.4 - Correlation between types of energy production levels+ 
UK France 
 Wind Solar Hydro Pumped   Wind Solar Hydro Biomass Pumped 
Wind 1     Wind 1     
Solar 0.08 1    Solar -0.14 1    
Hydro 0.32 -0.01 1   Hydro 0.02 0.08 1   
Pumped 0.02 0.06 0.49 1  Biomass -0.10 0.06 -0.10 1  
+ Note that "Biomass" does not appear as an energy 
category in the UK data. 
 Pumped -0.10 0.23 0.47 0.02 1 
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Table A.5- UK electricity demand+ 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant 30,531.22* 65.82 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (1:00am-1:59am)                                 -37.47 77.06 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (2:00am-2:59am) -593.20* 77.06 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (3:00am-3:59am) -938.36* 77.16 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (4:00am-4:59am) -961.60* 77.06 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (5:00am-5:59am) 433.58* 77.04 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (6:00am-6:59am) 3,811.13* 77.04 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (7:00am-7:59am) 7,015.79* 77.05 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!"  (8:00am-8:59am) 8,319.21* 77.00 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!"  (9:00am-9:59am) 8,702.65* 76.98 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!"  (10:00am-10:59am) 8,615.63* 76.99 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00am-11:59am) 8,566.19* 76.96 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (12:00am-12:59pm) 8,379.76* 76.94 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (1:00pm-1:59pm) 7,853.32* 77.01 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (2:00pm-2:59pm) 7,825.18* 77.02 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (3:00pm-3:59pm) 8,772.15* 77.08 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (4:00pm-4:59pm) 10,729.24* 77.07 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (5:00pm-5:59pm) 12,222.64* 77.08 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (6:00pm-6:59pm) 12,447.87* 77.00 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (7:00pm-7:59pm) 11,629.88* 76.98 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (8:00pm-8:59pm) 9,944.52* 77.02 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!" (9:00pm-9:59pm) 7,0755.11* 77.04 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (10:00pm-10:59pm) 3,355.18* 77.04 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00pm-11:59pm) 583.79* 77.04 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (February) 88.53* 55.12 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (March) -1,320.35* 54.19 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (April) -4,528.97* 54.63 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!"4 (May) -7,913.99* 54.19 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (June) -7,453.86* 54.64 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (July) -8,817.02* 54.19 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (August) -9,128.07* 54.19 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (September) -7,411.23* 55.11 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (October) -4,041.17* 54.19 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!!" (November) 639.90* 54.64 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (December) -124.40* 54.22 
Obs: 104,859 𝑅!: 0.72   
+ Figures are rounded to the second decimal and a "*" indicates significance at a 5% statistical level. 
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Table A.6 - UK renewable energy generation+ 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant 3,824.94* 27.23 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (1:00am-1:59am)                                 -32.48 31.88 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (2:00am-2:59am)                                 -50.66 31.88 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (3:00am-3:59am)                                 -31.49 31.92 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (4:00am-4:59am)                                 -19.31 31.88 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (5:00am-5:59am)                                  13.47 31.87 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (6:00am-6:59am) 281.89* 31.87 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (7:00am-7:59am) 582.38* 31.87 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!"  (8:00am-8:59am) 747.15* 31.85 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!"  (9:00am-9:59am) 875.36* 31.85 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!"  (10:00am-10:59am) 951.49* 31.85 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00am-11:59am) 1,035.04* 31.84 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (12:00am-12:59pm) 1,039.95* 31.83 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (1:00pm-1:59pm) 991.18* 31.85 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (2:00pm-2:59pm) 945.18* 31.86 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (3:00pm-3:59pm) 939.59* 31.89 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (4:00pm-4:59pm) 1,161.76* 31.88 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (5:00pm-5:59pm) 1,446.03* 31.88 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (6:00pm-6:59pm) 1,456.59* 31.85 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (7:00pm-7:59pm) 1,223.77* 31.85 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (8:00pm-8:59pm) 940.51* 31.86 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!" (9:00pm-9:59pm) 685.90* 31.87 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (10:00pm-10:59pm) 344.21* 31.87 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00pm-11:59pm) 81.96* 31.87 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (February) -459.69* 22.80 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (March) -1,566.40* 22.42 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (April) -1,619.67* 22.60 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!"4 (May) -1,841.83* 22.42 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (June) -2,867.49* 22.60 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (July) -2,237.43* 22.42 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (August) -1,933.71* 22.42 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (September) -1,422.34* 22.80 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (October) -1,348.58* 22.42 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!!" (November) -202.03* 22.60 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (December) 153.19* 22.43 
Obs: 104,859 𝑅!: 0.33   
+ Figures are rounded to the second decimal and a "*" indicates significance at a 5% statistical level. 
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Table A.7 - France electricity demand+ 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant 61,999.66* 190.09 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (1:00am-1:59am) -1,195.15* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (2:00am-2:59am) -3,702.59* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (3:00am-3:59am) -4,886.92* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (4:00am-4:59am) -3,957.79* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (5:00am-5:59am) -834.49* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (6:00am-6:59am) 3,148.03* 222.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (7:00am-7:59am) 5,512.54* 222.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!"  (8:00am-8:59am) 7,374.16* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!"  (9:00am-9:59am) 8,101.12* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!"  (10:00am-10:59am) 8,461.65* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00am-11:59am) 9,147.76* 222.33 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (12:00am-12:59pm) 8,420.46* 222.33 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (1:00pm-1:59pm) 6,295.27* 222.41 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (2:00pm-2:59pm) 4,879.77* 222.33 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (3:00pm-3:59pm) 3,803.55* 222.41 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (4:00pm-4:59pm) 3758.79* 222.33 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (5:00pm-5:59pm) 5,836.87* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (6:00pm-6:59pm) 8,026.65* 222.33 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (7:00pm-7:59pm) 6,508.14* 222.33 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (8:00pm-8:59pm) 4,267.90* 222.44 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!" (9:00pm-9:59pm) 3,895.15* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (10:00pm-10:59pm) 5,887.05* 222.48 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00pm-11:59pm) 3,703.46* 222.48 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (February) -666.29* 159.28 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (March) -3,427.96* 156.68 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (April) -12,498.95* 157.93 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!"4 (May) -19,923.79* 156.63 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (June) -21,143.46* 157.92 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (July) -20,998.07* 156.63 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (August) -22.937.64* 156.63 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (September) -19,940.83* 157.92 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (October) -14,706.24* 156.60 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!!" (November) -5,302.98* 157.93 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (December) 1,639.76* 156.72 
Obs: 35,067 𝑅!: 0.73	   
+ Figures are rounded to the second decimal and a "*" indicates significance at a 5% statistical level. 
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Table A.8 - France renewable energy generation+ 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant 7,559.96* 69.70 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (1:00am-1:59am) -623.70* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (2:00am-2:59am) -1,426.77* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (3:00am-3:59am) -1,814.88* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (4:00am-4:59am) -1,626.46* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (5:00am-5:59am) -367.26* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (6:00am-6:59am) 1,760.12* 81.59 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!" (7:00am-7:59am) 3,209.56* 81.59 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!"  (8:00am-8:59am) 4,427.23* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!"  (9:00am-9:59am) 5,232.58* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!"  (10:00am-10:59am) 5,629.24* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00am-11:59am) 5,863.28* 81.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (12:00am-12:59pm) 5,541.83* 81.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (1:00pm-1:59pm) 4,720.57* 81.55 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (2:00pm-2:59pm) 3,815.85* 81.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (3:00pm-3:59pm) 3,220.54* 81.55 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (4:00pm-4:59pm) 3,360.57* 81.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (5:00pm-5:59pm) 4,302.76* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (6:00pm-6:59pm) 5,292.81* 81.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (7:00pm-7:59pm) 4,393.87* 81.52 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (8:00pm-8:59pm) 3,040.39* 81.56 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!!!" (9:00pm-9:59pm) 2,502.36* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (10:00pm-10:59pm) 3,164.47* 81.58 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟!"!" (11:00pm-11:59pm) 1,908.58* 81.58 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (February) 2,861.60* 58.41 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (March) 1,548.87* 57.45 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (April) 1,213.30* 57.91 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!"4 (May) 534.98* 57.43 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (June) 1,261.40* 57.90 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (July) -974.45* 57.43 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (August) -2,615.64* 57.43 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!" (September) -3,701.50* 57.90 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (October) -4,342.31* 57.41 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!!!" (November) -1,840.59* 57.91 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ!"!" (December) -2,414.29* 57.47 
Obs: 35,067 𝑅!: 0.69	   
+ Figures are rounded to the second decimal and a "*" indicates significance at a 5% statistical level. 
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Figure A.1 - UK nuclear electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 5-mn intervals 
  
Figure A.2 - UK coal electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 5-mn intervals 
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Figure A.3 - UK CCGT electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 5-mn intervals 
 
Figure A.4 - UK OCGT electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 5-mn intervals 
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Figure A.5 - France nuclear electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 15-mn intervals 
 
 
 
Figure A.6 - France coal electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 15-mn intervals 
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Figure A.7 - France gas electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 15-mn intervals 
 
 
Figure A.8 - France oil electricity generation in MWh in 2016 in 15-mn intervals 
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Figure A.9 - UK electricity demand in MWh in the first week of 2016 in 5-mn intervals 
 
 
 
Figure A.10 - France electricity demand in MWh in the first week of 2016 in 15-mn intervals 
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Figure A.11 - Predicted UK electricity demand in MWh in the first week of 2016 
 
 
 
Figure A.12 - Predicted France electricity demand in MWh in the first week of 2016 
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Figure A.13 - UK total surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in the UK 
increases 
 
 
 
Figure A.14 - UK consumer surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in the 
UK increases 
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Figure A.15 - UK producer surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in the UK 
increases 
 
 
Figure A.16 - France total surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in France 
increases 
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Figure A.17 - France consumer surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in 
France increases 
 
 
Figure A.18 - France producer surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in 
France increases 
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Figure A.19 - UK and France total surplus gains from trade as the number of peak periods in 
France and the UK increases 
 
 
Figure A.20 - UK and France consumer surplus gains from trade as the number of peak 
periods in France and the UK increases 
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Figure A.21 - UK and France producer surplus gains from trade as the number of peak 
periods in France and the UK increases 
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